Introduction
Since the early 2000s when players outside the traditional music ecosystem started to commercialise new forms of digital distribution, the consumption of creative content has rapidly shifted over to Internet-based services. In response to consumers' craving for modern and more convenient forms of consuming entertainment -all enabled by faster Internet connections -digital service providers like Spotify, YouTube or Soundcloud have made interactive on-demand streaming the main form of music consumption via the Internet. 1
In Denmark, a recent assessment showed that streaming accounted for as much as 58.5 % of all revenues from recorded music, and in Norway the figure was 77 %. 2 Concurrently, the traditional picture of national exploitation of copyright has changed. The licensing of novel uses of copyright-protected materials from rightholders and their organisations has been described anything but smooth.
It appears that traditional licensing mechanisms and arrangements have not always been able to facilitate right-clearance in the changed environment. In the previous chapter, various aspects of the collective management of copyright were examined, including the traditional rationale of reducing transaction costs activity and private mechanisms. This is also the area of interplay that this chapter will focus upon.
First, the chapter examines the emergence of cross-border licensing models for online use, revisiting the distinct phases of model contracts, multi-territorial mono-repertoire licensing entities, licensing hubs, and the most recent forms of licensing and related regulatory activities. In its second part, the chapter analyses how well these developments accord with the user generated law methodology. Does the example of online licensing pass all phases of the theoretical model? Why have the licensing arrangements been created in the first place? Do determinants from the methodological model have an influence on the emergence of the specific user generated law? The chapter concludes with some broader observations on the applicability of the user generated law model. The other major publishers and several independent publishers followed suit with similar models which appointed their rights to new licensing entities or CMOs as exclusive or non-exclusive agents. Interestingly, the newly formed entities were in several instances formed as subsidiaries of major European CMOs. This process may have been negotiated at the expense of smaller CMOs, as Yet the phenomenon of multi-territorial licensing remains inextricably intertwined with mono-territorial licensing (i.e. licensing for only one country). 31
Musical works often have several authors and may be published by more than one publisher. 32 These split copyrights mean that it is sometimes not sufficient to clear rights with only one rightholder in order to cover a single song (see also recital 37 of Directive 2014/26/EU). Ultimately, from the online service providers' and consumers' perspective, the aggregation of a global repertoire is the major concern, as the European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs points out. 33 The fragmentation of rights, rightholders and repertoires is at the core of high transaction costs 34 -which collectivization of rights management 26 CELAS (Central European Licensing and Administration Services) was a licensing agency jointly owned by the German and British CMOs GEMA and PRS for Music. CELAS provided a one-stop shop for the repertoire of EMI Music Publishing for online exploitation. In 2014, Sony/ATV Music Publishing, PRS for Music and GEMA launched a new joint venture called SOLAR -a one-stop shop for the Sony/ATV and EMI music publishing licensing catalogue (see press release at: http://www.celas.eu/CelasTabs/Content/solarlaunch.pdf, September 2014). This followed the acquisition of EMI Music Publishing by Sony in 2012. SOLAR replaced the CELAS and PAECOL licensing systems. For a more detailed overview, see Schwemer, 153-155.
27 Giuseppe Mazziotti, 'New Licensing Models for Online Music Services in the European Union: From Collective to Customized Management' (2011) Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 11-269, uses the term "customized" collective rights management. Dehin (2010), 228 refers to it as the "new rights managers model". 28 originally aimed to reduce.
The development of these novel direct licensing arrangements must be seen in the context of the two actions taken by the EU Commission which sought to foster multi-territorial licensing of music rights for the Internet: the CISAC pro- It is interesting to note that the European legislator has chosen not to apply the rules of the CRM Directive to mono-repertoire licensing entities. Since such entities represent only a single rightholder, they fall outside the scope of the definitions of Article 3 lit (m) Directive 2014/26/EU.
Licensing hubs formed by author CMOs
More recently, new influences have appeared in the online music licensing ecosystem: several collective management organisations have joined forces and formed so-called 'licensing hubs' with the aim of providing a one-stop solution for acquiring licenses for online use of music.
These licensing hubs differ from the mono-repertoire multi-territorial direct licensing entities (see section above) in terms of the repertoire they license: a licensee can acquire a multi-territorial license for the joint repertoire of all the CMOs taking part in the respective hub model (multi-territorial, multirepertoire). pulled their catalogue. Besides the question of whether streaming constitutes a substitute for other forms of consumptions, 41 royalty rates have been a key concern. Rightholders have expressed their discontent with the negotiations led by the CMOs to which they have transferred their rights for exploitation. In a context characterised by increased transparency and technical means (namely backend software and reporting standards) academics, rightholders and users pose the question as to whether the traditional setup of collective management organisations is the most efficient means of licensing content. 42
In the US, a new player called Global Music Rights (GMR) 43 is aiming to take on music publishing incumbents for performance rights. Through direct licensing of selected popular songwriters, the licensor aims to negotiate higher royalties than the counterparts BMI and ASCAP. This leverage exists, for example, because GMR can refuse permissions regarding its songs, while the incumbents are highly regulated and need to offer blanket licenses. 44 While this specific example has to be seen in the context of the US ecosystem, it seems reasonable to consider whether similar developments would be possible in Europe. In Article 3 lit (b) the legislator also introduced the new notion of 'independent management entities'. 46 The main difference between collective manage-41 For an economic analysis see: Godefroy Dang Nguyen, Sylvain Dejean & François Moreau, 'Are streaming and other music consumption modes substitutes or complements?' (2012) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025071. 42 For a discussion of the traditional rationales for collective management in the digital era, see Katz (2006 Art. 3 lit (b) it defines 'independent management entity' as any organisation "which is authorised by law or by way of assignment, license or any other contractual arrangement to manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of more than one rightholder, for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main purpose, and which is: (i) ment organisations and an independent management entity lies in the ownership or control structure; the latter is neither owned nor controlled by rightholders and is organised on a for-profit basis. So far, there is some ambiguity as to what such entities are and it remains a matter of speculation as to whether the European legislator had such developments in mind. 47
It remains to be seen how Member States will choose to implement the definition and the rule in Article 31, which is directed towards situations where a CMO does not grant or offer to grant multi-territorial licenses or does not allow another CMO to represent those rights for such purpose by 10 April 2017.
The operational picture
In the context of cross-border licensing, the user generated law framework may and ICE are also used by other European CMOs, for example the Dutch society neither owned nor controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part by rightholders; and (ii) organised on a for-profit basis". In recital 15 to Directive 2014/26/EU, those are described as commercial entities inter alia because they are not owned or controlled by rightholders. However, to the extent such independent management entities carry out the same activities as collective management organisations, they should be obliged to provide certain information to the rightholders they represent, collective management organisations, users and the public. 47 Given the reference to 'collective benefit' in the definition of an independent management entity, the feature that rightholders have no control makes the provision somewhat contradictory. Recital 16 contains a list of what should not be regarded 'independent management entities'. 48 The European Commission, for example, mentions the outsourcing of back-office functions in the accompanying memo to its proposal for the CRM Directive (MEMO/12/545 at point 15). See also my prior research in Schwemer (2014).
3 The online music-licensing ecosystem as an example of user generated law
The previous section illustrates that multiple intertwined developments and arrangements for the licensing of music online have occurred and that they must be seen in their distinct historical context. This section analyses how well these developments accord with the user generated law framework. 
Autonomy spaces and interdependencies between the licensing models
The developments around cross-border licensing models are characterised by an interplay between private arrangements and regulatory activity. This interaction is between self-organisation on one side, and soft-law measures (such as green papers), and Recommendations, and recent legislative measures, as well as competition proceedings on the other side. Such interactions are an important consideration when applying the user generated law framework to these licensing models. This dynamic can partly be understood according to what is termed autonomy spaces in user generated law methodology. Autonomy spaces refer to State-enacted law that defines a space within which persons or organisations 49 See press release at: https://www.ncb.dk/05/news/ 2014-12-03-nmp-buma-ice-press-release.pdf.
may act autonomously. 50
Collective management organisations are regulated to a varying degree across European countries and set up in a range of ways. In some cases, for example, national organisations are de facto monopolies and in other cases de jure monopolies. 51 The degree of regulation can also vary: the German CMOs, for instance, were traditionally highly regulated, while the French CMOs were intermediately regulated, and the British CMOs lightly regulated. 52 Thus, European CMOs traditionally had different spaces to operate in.
In addition, there might also be a certain interplay between the different licensing models. Have the Barcelona and Santiago standard agreements served as inspiration for later models or prepared conditions for them? Is the licensing hub idea implemented in the current multi-territorial licensing models? Or are all arrangements more or less independent developments, created without reference to other or earlier models? Given the complexity of the developments in a field that is not static but constantly developing, it is difficult to obtain a clear picture; but it is safe to say there have been at least some interdependencies. While further exploring these questions does not fall within the scope of this chapter, it is important to acknowledge that the correlations between the different licensing models can point towards the dissemination criterion of the user generated law model. If a licensing model has been copied or served as inspiration for later constructions, the original model has been disseminated and thus further processed within the model framework. wholly or in part, by rightholders. It is important to note that the different licensing arrangements have not necessarily replaced each other but rather added additional licensing layers over time.
Figure 1: Evolution of licensing arrangements

The emergence of cross-border models
The first phase of user generated law is the emergence phase which is deemed to rely on four determinants: (1) heterogeneous demands for legal solutions,
(2) expectation of benefits, (3) asymmetric information and (4) the existence of one or more lead users. Can those four determinants construe the emergence of private regulatory models within this sub-space of intellectual property rights?
Heterogeneous demand
The first determinant for the emergence of user generated law is held to be the heterogeneous demand for legal solutions. Though not contained in the original model by Eric von Hippel, the cross-border dimension is proffered as a crucial element within the user generated law framework. 53 The Internet's borderless technological nature enables users to access content from all over the world. Online licensing is inherently more of a cross-border undertaking than traditional offline licensing. This is also where the heterogeneity lies. Existing licensing 53 Riis, Chapter 1 of this book.
models, it appears, have not been able to deal with cross-border licensing in the digital context.
As I have noted in the findings of earlier research:
"music-streaming services usually approach their markets on a territorial and not on a pan-European level. The decision to enter a local market is influenced by a combination of several elements: one key consideration constitutes the ability to get the respective rights at a cost efficient level. A second key consideration concerns the general economic situation and the general legal context of the respective local market." 54
Expectation of benefits
Private regulatory models are supposedly only created if users can expect benefits from them (i.e. the models generate value by being used). This condition is fulfilled if the parties (rightholders and licensees) benefit from the licensing models. We can differentiate between regulatory models that do not require an institutional set-up (e.g. pure contractual agreements) and models that do (e.g. copyright collective management organisations that require an organisation to collect remuneration). 55 The greater the set-up costs involved, the greater the expected benefits must be in order for a private regulatory model to be deployed. KEA Affairs (2012) identifies in its report on online music licensing that the fragmentation of rights, rightholders and repertoires is at the core of high transaction costs in Europe. 56 On this issue, the European legislator formulates the aspiration of the CRM Directive to facilitate new online services and thereby enhance consumer choice and lead to a reduction in transaction costs which should be passed on to consumers. 57 When imposing legislation on the space, the Commission expresses its expectation that music publishers would consider "re-entrusting part of their rights to collecting societies that comply with passport requirements and fulfil certain conditions of good governance". 58
The mere existence of the multi-territorial licensing arrangements suggests that either the parties enjoy benefits or that the legislator has forced these models. 59 54 Schwemer (2014), 150. 55 Riis, Chapter 1 of this book. 56 KEA Affairs (2012), 51. 57 Recital 44 of Directive 2014/26/EU. 58 See European Commission, Impact Assessment 2005, 162. CELAS, for example, concluded sub-agency agreements with collecting societies such as KODA (DK), STIM (SE) and TEOSTO (FI). 59 It is an open question as to whether the users benefit as well, considering the monopoly power of rightholders.
Asymmetric information
Compared to legislating multi-territorial licensing, private arrangements are argued to be better at addressing the problematic asymmetry of information possessed by the legislator and the parties affected by the law. The ensuing argumentation and narrative adheres closely to the discussion in the previous chapter on "Collective Agreements for the Clearance of Copyrights -The Case of Collective Management and Extended Collective Licenses" with minor adjustments. In practice, the legislator will regularly lack the requisite information for solving the task in an optimal way. A freely organized multi-territorial licensing regime between the different parties will be based on much more adequate information than a decision made by the legislator. In this way, asymmetric information is an essential dynamic in the emergence of cross-border licensing models. In regard to such cross-border licensing, the legislator has partly regulated the field with the CRM Directive. This has implications for the adoption of the legal innovations and will be discussed in the section devoted to that part of the model. In the downstream relation it is more difficult to draw a clear picture. One can assume that online music service providers (and possibly rightholders themselves) have pushed CMOs to offer the requested licenses. 61 Yet there is no clear evidence available that this would have led to the development of private regulation. Scrutiny of the commercial motivations of those involved suggests that service providers initially had little interest in multi-territorial licensing models since they approached markets for commercial reasons on a country-by-country basis.
In relation to the emergence of direct licensing (i.e. multi-territorial monorepertoire licensors like CELAS) the Court argues in the CISAC case that:
"the abandonment of the exclusivity clause made possible certain developments in the market, namely the grant of the first direct licenses, which are necessary if an eventual move beyond the national territorial limitations is to be envisaged" 62 The court continues that: repertoire rightholders behind the novel licensing entities and arrangement had a preference for this setup. 64 On the other hand, smaller rightholders such as those dealing with niche repertoire might not necessarily gain the same benefits from this setup. 65 The large incumbents acted in a fashion described as lead users within the user generated framework. In summary, it is evident that this process has relied on the engagement of different lead users with different levels of involvement. CMOs feature as users, along with the community consisting of rightholders and other relevant stakeholders in the industry. Yet rightholders themselves have also engaged in the process in ways which resemble the lead user paradigm.
Diffusion phase
Once new licensing arrangements emerge, communities form around the legal innovation. This is the second phase of the user generated law framework. The framework does not offer further refinement of the community definition which can be understood in both a broad and a narrow sense.
Model contracts developed by umbrella organisations have been used by CMOs as a basis for their bilateral reciprocal agreements. 67 In regard to multiterritorial mono-repertoire licensing, entities like CELAS, all other major publishers, and several independent publishers have followed suit and adopted similar models. In the case of licensing HUBs, several other collective management organisations have joined Armonia. Thus, it appears that all of the described licensing arrangements have formed more or less broad communities around them.
Adoption phase
In terms of the adoption of legal innovations, the user generated law methodology foresees two forms for this which both take their starting point in the legislator: private regulatory models evolve either as new layers of law based on State-enacted law or as sui generis legal systems. Again, it is useful to differentiate between the arrangements as legal innovations: model contracts, multi-territorial mono-repertoire licensing entities, and licensing hubs.
As seen in section 3.1, there is a distinct interplay between private initiatives and regulatory activity in the sphere of online music licensing. A lack of satisfactory legal innovation (in this context referring to a solution for cross border licensing of online music) led the legislator to come up with a non-binding instrument, namely the Recommendation of 2005, in order to achieve its policy goals. Almost one decade later, the legislator has regulated part of the playing field. The CRM Directive aims towards the establishment of hubs for the licensing of online music by author-CMOs. In this context it is interesting to note that the European legislator has chosen not to apply the rules of the CRM Directive to the mono-repertoire licensing entities. 68 In the working documents accompanying the Directive there is no evidence that would offer further insight into the legislator's reasoning. This might point towards the fact that the European Commission has been satisfied with the developments in the space. As seen above, the development of initiatives such as Armonia dates back to before the entry into force of the Directive but after the Recommendation. Regarding the codification of this specific licensing form, it appears that the legislator does not adopt the legal innovations but rather takes action in order to define the playing field for licensing -the autonomy space -given the lack of satisfactory solutions provided by the actors.
Competition authorities have also been actively involved in stirring up the licensing arrangements. This ultimately meant that the lead users (umbrella organisations) and its community (CMOs) did not pursue their legal innovation further (reciprocal representation agreements based on model contracts containing customer allocation clauses) culminating in the CISAC proceedings. The intervention of DG COMP does not imply a failing of the user generated law, but suggests rather that the model has been partly adopted and the respective autonomy space corrected. Other initiatives to facilitate industry solutions represent a further grey-zone regarding the legislator's engagement. 69 All told, it seems that the case of multi-territorial licenses is not easily put into the existing categories and that more levels of adoption might arise from this complexity.
Concluding remarks
For over a decade, stakeholders have been busy adapting the traditional licensing arrangements for online music licensing from the territorial tradition of copyright to the cross-border and multi-territorial reality of a knowledge society. In the user generated law framework, "law that accommodates the needs of the knowledge society" is characterised by (1) flexible norms, (2) with cross-68 See discussion above under section 2.2. 69 For example the Licenses for Europe stakeholder dialogue (2014). border scope and (3) which are industry-and subject-specific. It appears that the developments in cross-border licensing of music rights are in many ways a prototype of those characteristics. The licensing solutions are highly industryand subject-specific: namely addressing the situational need for interactive ondemand streaming, thus permitting users to actively choose the musical works and the time of consumption, and thereby reflecting the heterogeneity in demand for legal solutions. The cross-border element has also been crucial in the development of legal solutions, reflecting the global dimension of the content and its distribution via the Internet. Finally, the question arises as to whether the norms are flexible, reflecting the complexity and the fast pace of development.
One could argue that because of the highly specific subject matter related to a technological and market phenomenon (i.e. streaming of music), these new developments are not sufficiently covered to qualify as flexible. Understanding flexibility within this subspace, it appears that the norms are sufficiently adaptive. In the case of music licensing, it is striking that in different facets the European legislator has played an important role: an interplay that is challenging to construe within the user generated law framework.
The developments in the licensing landscape must be seen in the multi- where mashups and remixes are a major part of the content.
Music is often described as a harbinger for other forms of entertainment goods, and the trend towards on-demand access can be seen in the number of consumers now watching films and TV productions via services like Netflix, or accessing books via commercial players like Oyster in the US or Mofibo in Denmark or the Bokhylla (Norwegian for "bookshelf") project by the Norwegian national library. These industry verticals face similar market challenges, but may have gone through different developments (or indeed some common trends) concerning their licensing models. By also applying the user generated law model to those verticals, the paradigm will be tested further which may in turn provide important policy implications.
